Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans: Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey by Alessandra Guariglia & Sheri Markose
Fiscal Studies (2000) vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 469–488 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2000 
Voluntary Contributions to Personal 
Pension Plans: Evidence from the 
British Household Panel Survey 
ALESSANDRA GUARIGLIA and SHERI MARKOSE
* 
Abstract 
In this paper, we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1992 to 
1998 to study the determinants of saving in the form of voluntary contributions to personal pension 
plans (PPPs). We first estimate a probit model with selection for the probability of making these 
voluntary contributions. We then estimate a random-effects tobit regression for the amounts 
contributed and compare the results with those of a similar regression for conventional saving. Our 
findings suggest that voluntary contributions to PPPs are made essentially for retirement purposes, 
whereas conventional saving is undertaken for precautionary motives. The former type of saving is 
thus unlikely to offset the latter completely. 
JEL classification: D12, D91, E21, I38, J32. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s, the UK pension system was characterised by a significant shift 
away from public pay-as-you-go towards private funded pension provision. Prior 
to 1988, employees with income above a lower earnings limit could join the 
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), which is a pay-as-you-go 
earnings-related scheme, for the provision of the second-tier part of their 
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retirement income.
1 Alternatively, they could contract out of SERPS, into 
defined benefit occupational pension schemes, which were generally made 
compulsory by employers to eligible employees.
2 
Following the 1986 Social Security Act, an important reform in the direction 
of a privately funded pension system was that employees were allowed to 
contract out of SERPS into personal pension plans (PPPs). Personal pensions are 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs), directly comparable to the IRAs existing 
in the US. In these schemes, contributions are accumulated in a fund.
3 In order to 
contract out of SERPS into a personal plan, a minimum contribution has to be 
made into the plan. This contribution is made directly by the Department of 
Social Security (DSS), using a proportion of the individual’s NICs. Initially, this 
proportion was made up of the contracting-out rebate, which was available to 
members of occupational pension schemes prior to the reform, plus an extra 2 
per cent incentive reduction of the NIC rate for not previously contracted-out 
employees.
4 The part of the PPP that contains the contributions made by the DSS 
is called an appropriate personal pension (APP) or rebate-only scheme, and it 
provides ‘protected-rights’ benefits which stand in the place of SERPS benefits 
(Blake, 2000). Between the ages of 60 and 75, the funds accumulated in the APP 
and the investment returns from these funds must be used to purchase an annuity, 
which must be joint with life, have limited price indexation and be priced on a 
unisex base. 
Another characteristic of the 1986 Act was that occupational pensions were 
made voluntary in all cases. This gave many employees likely to change jobs 
                                                                                                                                    
1A first-tier flat-rate state pension can be received by anyone who makes the required National Insurance 
contributions (NICs). The basic pension for a single person is currently worth £67.50 a week, which represents 
16 per cent of average earnings. One problem with this type of pension is that it rises with prices, not with 
earnings. Given the increase in real wages, a second-tier earnings-related provision is thus necessary to 
compensate for the reduction in the ratio of first-tier state pension to average earnings. A large number of 
pensioners also receive means-tested benefits such as income support, housing benefit and council tax benefit 
(Dilnot et al., 1994). 
2By contracting out of SERPS into an occupational pension plan, employees (and employers) paid reduced 
NICs, and the pension scheme initially took responsibility for paying all members a guaranteed minimum 
pension (GMP) on retirement (see Dilnot et al. (1994)). Since April 1997, however, GMPs no longer accrue. 
They have been replaced with a new test (the reference scheme test) on the overall quality of the scheme. To be 
able to contract out of SERPS, the occupational scheme must offer benefits that are broadly the same as or 
better than the test standard (Tonks, 1999). 
3These types of schemes are defined contribution schemes. 
4The contracting-out rebate made available to members of occupational pension schemes was initially set at 5.8 
per cent of the employee’s earnings between the lower and upper earnings limits. From April 1993, it was 
reduced to 4.8 per cent. Since April 1997, the DSS rebate has been available on an age-related basis. The 2 per 
cent extra rebate was aimed at providing an incentive for individuals still in SERPS to contract out of SERPS 
into personal schemes. It was thus a temporary incentive, which was subsequently reduced to 1 per cent for 
people over 30 (see Disney and Whitehouse (1992) and Budd and Campbell (1998)). According to Budd and 
Campbell (1998), in 1992–93, the median contribution of contracted-out rebate into a PPP account was £9 per 
week for a man and £6 per week for a woman. Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans 
471 
often the incentive to take PPPs instead. Being defined contribution rather than 
defined benefit plans, the latter are in fact ‘portable’, which means that changing 
jobs does not affect the value of the personal pension. The reform also allowed 
workers who decided to contract out of SERPS to take on occupational defined 
contribution schemes. The latter were, however, much less widely spread than 
the defined contribution personal pension schemes. As a consequence of the 
reforms, by 1992, 28 per cent of male and 19 per cent of female employees had 
contracted out into personal pensions (Dilnot et al., 1994).
5 
Individuals are not required to make any additional contribution into their 
PPPs on top of those made on their behalf by the DSS. Especially for younger 
people, a rebate-only personal pension is likely to provide a better pension than 
SERPS (Disney and Whitehouse, 1992).
6 However, individuals have the option 
to make voluntary contributions.
7 These contributions are deductible against 
income tax up to a certain limit, and investment returns are also tax-free.
8 When 
they retire, individuals can withdraw a 25 per cent lump-sum amount tax-free 
from the proceeds of that part of their personal pension that is made up of their 
voluntary contributions. Between the ages of 50 and 75, they can use the 
remaining 75 per cent to buy an annuity, which is more flexible than the one they 
can purchase with the protected-rights part of their pension. According to the 
British Household Panel Survey, in 1992, 73 per cent of those employees who 
were covered by PPPs made voluntary contributions to the fund. Little attention 
has been devoted in the literature to these voluntary contributions. The first 
objective of this paper is to bridge this gap. 
There is an ongoing debate in the US on whether contributions to pension 
plans such as IRAs and 401(k)s
9 crowd out other personal saving (see, among 
others, Bernheim (1999) for a survey, Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996), Gale 
(1998) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995 and 1996)). This is a crucial issue in 
                                                                                                                                    
5The very rapid (and unexpected) take-up of personal pensions can also be explained by the so-called ‘mis-
selling’ of personal pensions. For instance, thousands of members of occupational pension plans were 
persuaded to switch out of them into personal pensions, even though they would have been better off staying 
with their original plans. Another factor that might have pushed employees to shift from an occupational 
pension plan to a personal pension is the trade-off of current for future consumption implied in some cases by 
the shift. As explained by Barrientos (1998), workers who were required by their occupational pension schemes 
to make contributions above the NI contributions could reduce these to the NI contributions by shifting to a 
personal pension (also see Disney and Stears (1996)). 
6However, note that, given the high charges that characterise rebate-only personal pensions, individuals often 
choose to have a personal pension, while not contracting out of SERPS. In this way, they can take advantage of 
the tax privileges associated with saving through pensions without giving up the SERPS benefits. 
7The proceeds of these voluntary contributions represent the third-tier part of the individuals’ retirement 
income. 
8Before July 1997, dividend tax credits were payable at a rate of 20 per cent on shares held in private pensions. 
In July 1997, these dividend tax credits were abolished, making the tax-favoured position of personal pensions 
slightly worse. As shown in Emmerson and Tanner (2000), every £1 of dividend income was in fact worth 
£1.25 before July 1997, but only £1 thereafter. 
9401(k)s are voluntary corporate pension plans, where employees can decide how their money is invested. Fiscal Studies 
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determining whether contributions to PPPs represent new saving. Because they 
have a more favourable tax treatment than other forms of saving, personal 
pensions increase the net return to saving. This generates an income effect, 
which should reduce overall saving, as well as a substitution effect, which 
should work in the opposite direction, leading to an ambiguous overall effect. In 
addition, being illiquid, pensions should raise the saving of those households that 
face binding liquidity constraints (Gale, 1998). As Samwick (1998, p. 134) puts 
it, ‘the disadvantage of the retirement account relative to other savings accounts 
is that it cannot be used prior to retirement if needed to buffer consumption 
against random falls in income’. It is therefore reasonable to assume that agents 
use saving in the form of voluntary contributions to PPPs to ensure a 
comfortable living standard in retirement, while taking advantage of the tax 
incentives,
10 and conventional saving to buffer current consumption against 
income shocks. The two forms of saving, being undertaken for different reasons, 
are thus unlikely to be interchangeable and to offset each other totally (Gale, 
1998). In such circumstances, one can expect voluntary contributions to PPPs to 
be at least partially financed with reductions in consumption or increases in 
labour supply. To this extent, these contributions represent new saving. 
The second objective of this paper is to shed some light on this issue. We 
initially focus on the determinants of tax-favoured saving in the form of 
voluntary contributions to PPPs and see how they compare with those of more 
conventional savings vehicles. Our results, based on data from the British 
Household Panel Survey for the years 1992 to 1998, show that, while saving in 
the form of voluntary contributions to PPPs tends to increase with age, saving in 
more liquid vehicles is strongly affected by earnings variability. This confirms 
that the two types of saving are indeed accumulated for different purposes: the 
former to ensure a comfortable retirement and the latter for precautionary 
reasons. Together with the fact that controlling for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity we find no evidence of a negative relationship between the two 
types of saving, this result corroborates the hypothesis that the two types of 
saving are unlikely to offset each other completely. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section II, we illustrate our 
dataset and present some descriptive statistics. In Section III, we first describe 
the results of a probit regression with selection, which sheds some light on the 
determinants of the probability of making voluntary contributions to PPPs. We 
then estimate a random-effects tobit regression for the amounts contributed, 
which we compare with a similar regression for conventional saving. Section IV 
presents some concluding remarks. 
                                                                                                                                    
10Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998) provide an alternative explanation for why workers save in the form 
of voluntary contributions to PPPs. They argue that short-run discount rates are much higher than long-run 
rates (hyperbolic discounting); consumers would thus like to save more than they in fact do, and they use 
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II. MAIN FEATURES OF THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. The Dataset 
The data used in this paper consist of waves 2 to 8 of the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), covering the years 1992 to 1998. A representative sample 
of 10,000 individuals living in Britain were interviewed in 1991. These 
individuals, together with their co-residents, were interviewed again each year 
thereafter. The BHPS provides information on respondents’ demographic, 
occupational, educational, income and saving characteristics.
11 We limit our 
analysis to all employees aged between 20 and 65, excluding the self-
employed.
12 We thus have an unbalanced panel, made up of 8,608 workers and 
corresponding to 33,478 person-year observations. 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
In each wave of the BHPS except wave 1, individuals are asked the following 
question on their participation in PPPs: ‘In the past year, … have you paid any 
contributions or premiums for a private personal pension, or had such 
contributions paid on your behalf by the DSS?’. Column 1 of Table 1 shows that, 
on average, 21.82 per cent of employees were covered by a PPP over the period 
1992–98.
13 The proportion covered is lower for the under-25s and for the over-
55s, and higher for those respondents aged between 25 and 29. As explained by 
Disney, Emmerson and Tanner (1999, p. 10), ‘this is not surprising since these 
people will have longer to accumulate interest in either funds and are also more  
 
                                                                                                                                    
11For more details on the BHPS, see Taylor (1994) and Taylor (1996). 
12Although the self-employed are the main participants to PPPs (see Disney, Emmerson and Tanner (1999)), we 
have excluded them from our sample for the following reasons. First, it was crucial to include within the 
explanatory variables of our equations for voluntary contributions to PPPs and for more conventional saving a 
measure of expected earnings variability to capture the precautionary motive for saving, but data on earnings 
are not provided for the self-employed. Second, for the self-employed, it is particularly difficult to separate 
personal saving from saving invested in the firm. Third, the self-employed are typically characterised by severe 
problems of under-reporting (Alessie and Lusardi, 1997). 
13Sometimes, individuals state that they belong to a company pension scheme and make contributions into a 
PPP. This can happen in four cases. First, individuals could contribute to a PPP as part of self-employment and 
be on an occupational pension as part of employment: for instance, an academic could contribute to a PPP out 
of consulting income while still being in the University Superannuation Scheme (USS). Second, members of 
occupational schemes might be allowed to make additional contributions to their pensions. In most cases, the 
contribution facility is arranged by the pension scheme itself, and the contributions are called additional 
voluntary contributions (AVCs). In other, less frequent, cases, the facility may be arranged by some other 
provider, and the contributions are referred to as free-standing additional voluntary contributions (FSAVCs). 
Both AVCs and FSAVCs are considered as personal pensions (see Blake (1995) and Tonks (1999)). Third, 
individuals could have a contracted-in occupational scheme and contract out with a personal pension, in which 
case, however, voluntary contributions are not allowed. Finally, when asked about their employer’s pension 
scheme, individuals might actually be referring to a group personal pension scheme, which would obviously 
allow for voluntary contributions. Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 1 
Participation in PPPs and Voluntary Contribution Patterns 
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A levels / professional qualns 
O levels / vocational qualns 
No qualifications 
Earnings 
Decile group 1 (lowest) 
Decile group 2 
Decile group 3 
Decile group 4 
Decile group 5 
Decile group 6 
Decile group 7 
Decile group 8 
Decile group 9 
Decile group 10 (highest) 
Financial situation and saving 
Finl situation perceived as good 
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Notes to Table 1 
aThe percentage of employees participating in PPPs represents the number of employees who answered yes to 
the question ‘In the past year, … have you paid any contributions or premiums for a private personal pension, 
or had such contributions paid on your behalf by the DSS?’ divided by the total number of employees who 
were asked the question. 
bThe percentage of PPP members making voluntary contributions is given by the proportion of the sum of all 
post-1988 and pre-1988 PPP participants who respectively answered yes to the question ‘Since September 1
st 
[of last year], over and above those contributions paid on your behalf by the DSS, have you yourself made 
any extra contributions towards your personal pension?’ or gave a non-zero response to the question ‘How 
much was your last contribution or premium?’. 
cThis type of saving includes saving in bank, building society or Post Office accounts, accumulated for reasons 
other than to meet regular bills, as well as share purchase schemes and personal equity plan schemes. 
Source: BHPS, waves 2 to 8. 
 
likely to benefit from their flexibility’. Personal pension coverage is higher for 
males than females and for people with A levels or professional qualifications 
than employees with higher or lower educational qualifications. It also tends to 
increase with net monthly earnings: only 6.66 per cent of employees in the 
lowest salary decile are covered, compared with 29.39 per cent of those in the 
highest decile. This might be due to the high upfront charges that characterise 
PPPs, making them inappropriate for workers with low earnings (Disney, 
Emmerson and Tanner, 1999). Similarly, of the individuals who perceive their 
present financial situation as good, 22.95 per cent are covered, compared with 
16.50 per cent of those who perceive it as bad. Finally, 24.34 per cent of the 
individuals who save in more conventional vehicles (the savers) are covered by 
PPPs, compared with 19.08 per cent of those who do not save.
14 The pattern of 
workers’ participation in PPPs is not regular. If we consider the workers who 
were present in all seven waves (balanced sample), we can see that 51.84 per 
cent never participated in a PPP while only 7.85 per cent participated in all 
waves.
15 
If the answer to the question on participation in a PPP is positive, individuals 
are then asked whether their policy was taken out before 1 July 1988 or since 
then. Respondents whose pensions started before 1 July 1988 are then asked 
‘How much was your last contribution or premium?’ and ‘How long did that 
cover?’. 
Personal pensions taken out before 1 July 1988 were essentially retirement 
annuities, also known as Section 226 policies.
16 These are no longer available as 
                                                                                                                                    
14The individuals who save in more conventional vehicles are those who answered yes to the question ‘Do you 
save any amount of your income, for example by putting something away now and then in a bank, building 
society, or Post Office account other than to meet regular bills? Please include share purchase schemes and 
Personal Equity Plan schemes.’. 
15Contrary to Disney, Emmerson and Tanner (1999), who define individuals as having a personal pension over 
the entire period considered if they say that they belong to a personal pension at least once during the period, 
we allow individuals’ pension status to change from one year to the next. 
16Retirement annuities were generally taken by the self-employed and by those employees whose employer did 
not provide a pension. These policies had been created as a result of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act of Fiscal Studies 
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new investments, but if an individual already has one, he or she can keep it. One 
difference between pre- and post-1988 personal pensions is that only for the 
latter does the DSS make contributions directly into the fund. Since the 
contracting-out option does not apply to retirement annuities, all the 
contributions in those plans are voluntary. On average, about 25 per cent of the 
employees covered by a PPP between 1992 and 1998 had a pre-1988 pension 
plan. 
Respondents whose pension started after 1 July 1988 are asked ‘Since 
September 1
st [of last year], over and above those contributions paid on your 
behalf by the DSS, have you yourself made any extra contributions towards your 
personal pension?’, ‘How much was your last contribution?’ and ‘How long did 
it cover?’. 
Column 2 of Table 1 looks at the proportion of employees covered by either 
pre- or post-1988 PPPs who made voluntary contributions to their PPPs.
17 We 
can see that between 1992 and 1998, this proportion was 73.38 per cent. The 
proportion tends to increase with age, going from 60.40 per cent for the 20–24 
age-group to 89.66 per cent for the 60–65 age-group. Of the males belonging to 
PPPs, 75.45 per cent made voluntary contributions, compared with 70.68 per 
cent of the females. The proportion of PPP members making voluntary 
contributions generally rises with educational qualifications and with real 
monthly earnings, and it is higher for those individuals who save in more 
conventional vehicles. 
The average non-zero weekly voluntary contribution to a PPP over the period 
1992–98 was £14.92. It increased from £12.96 in 1992 to £16.32 by 1998. 
Column 3 of Table 1 shows that the average contribution increases gradually 
with age for employees aged 20 to 59. The highest average contribution, made 
by people in the 55–59 age-group, is £27.08. Males generally contribute more 
than females, and more-educated people more than the less-educated. The 
average weekly voluntary contribution also goes up with real earnings. Finally, 
the average contribution of the savers (£15.96) is higher than that of the non-
savers (£13.43). 
For comparison purposes, we report in column 4 the respondents’ average 
non-zero weekly saving in more conventional vehicles. These figures are 
obtained by dividing by four the answer to the question ‘About how much on 
average do you manage to save a month?’, which was asked of those individuals 
who answered yes to the question on whether they saved any amount of their 
income, spelled out in footnote 14. We can see that, over the sample period, the 
average non-zero weekly saving in conventional forms (£8.56) is smaller than 
                                                                                                                                    
1970. Before 1970, there were approved deferred-annuity contracts written under the 1956 Finance Act (Blake 
and Orszag, 1999). 
17From this point on, we shall consider PPPs in a broad sense, including APPs, retirement annuities and other 
personal pensions. It is important to note that, although this is not possible for APPs, one can have a personal 
pension without necessarily being contracted out (also see footnote 6). Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans 
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the average non-zero weekly voluntary contribution to PPPs (£14.92). 
Considering these figures as a percentage of weekly earnings, the corresponding 
numbers are 4.61 per cent and 6.43 per cent respectively. The differences in 
conventional saving across age-groups are less evident than the differences in 
voluntary contributions to PPPs. Like the voluntary contributions, conventional 
saving generally increases with education and earnings. It is interesting to see 
that the difference between average voluntary contributions to PPPs and average 
conventional saving also tends to increase with education and earnings. For 
instance, for those individuals belonging to the lowest earnings decile, this 
difference amounts to about £2, whereas for the individuals belonging to the 
highest decile, it amounts to about £14. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we will initially estimate a probit equation for the probability of 
making voluntary contributions to PPPs. Since data on these contributions are 
only available for those individuals who participate in a PPP, there is a potential 
sample selection bias. Failure to account for sample selection is likely to lead to 
inconsistent estimation of the parameters determining the probability of making 
voluntary contributions to PPPs, as these might be confounded with parameters 
determining the probability of participating in PPPs. To correct for the sample 
selection bias, we use the maximum likelihood methodology illustrated in Van 
de Ven and Van Pragg (1981). We subsequently analyse the determinants of the 
amounts that people contribute to their pensions, focusing on how they compare 
with the determinants of saving in more conventional and more liquid forms. By 
doing this, we aim to shed some light on whether and to what extent the two 
types of saving tend to offset each other. 
1. Probit Regression with Sample Selection for the Probability of Making 
Voluntary Contributions to PPPs 
In order to analyse what determines the probability of making voluntary 




11 , it it it yx u β ′ =+  
where: 
*
it y  represents the net benefit of making a voluntary contribution for 
individual  i at time t and is unobservable; and  it x  represents a set of 
characteristics of individual i at time t, including age, educational and 
occupational dummies, gender, number of children and number of adults present 
in the household, marital and health status, and a home-ownership dummy. Fiscal Studies 
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These variables are assumed to affect the individual’s preferences.  it x  also 
includes the respondent’s expectations about his or her financial situation in the 
year to come and a proxy for his or her permanent income.
18 The former variable 
is included to see whether, in accordance with the permanent income hypothesis, 
individuals save to offset expected declines in income, while the latter is 
included because there is evidence that saving varies with permanent income 
(Carroll and Samwick, 1997 and 1998).
19 
Having assumed that 
*
it y  represents the net benefit of making a voluntary 
contribution and is unobservable, we focus on the binary variable indicating 
whether individual i makes any voluntary contributions at time t, i.e. on the 













it y  is only observed for those individuals who participate in a PPP, because only 
those are asked questions about the voluntary contributions that they make to 
their plans. Following Van de Ven and Van Pragg’s (1981) method, we therefore 
estimate equation (1) using a probit model with sample selection. The selection 
mechanism is determined by the following equation: 
(3) 
*
22 , it it it zw u β ′ =+  
where 
*
it z  represents the unobservable net benefit of participating in a PPP for 
individual i at time t. Since we only observe whether individual i participates in a 
PPP, we only have an indicator of the sign of 
*














it z  is the binary variable indicating whether individual i participates in a PPP in 
year t.  it w  includes all the variables in  it x , together with other variables that are 
                                                                                                                                    
18Permanent income is calculated by taking the fitted values from a random-effects regression of individuals’ 
real net monthly earnings on demographic variables, a home-ownership dummy, regional, educational and 
occupational dummies, and interactions of the last two groups of dummies with age and age squared (see 
Carroll, Dynan and Krane (1999)). 
19Permanent income and home-ownership can also be seen as proxies for respondents’ wealth. Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans 
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assumed to affect the respondent’s decision to take a PPP but not his or her 
decision on whether to make additional contributions to the plan. These 
additional variables are mainly related to the individual’s job, and more in 
particular to his or her job mobility.
20 They are the individual’s job tenure, the 
number of different jobs he or she held in year t and dummies indicating whether 
he or she has a permanent job, works full-time or works in the private sector. 
The residuals in equations (1) and (3) are assumed to follow a bivariate 
standard normal distribution with correlation coefficient  ρ . Let us denote by P 
the set of individuals who participate in PPPs, with Φ  the standard cumulative 
normal distribution function and  2 Φ  the cumulative bivariate normal distribution 
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The first term refers to those respondents who have a PPP and make voluntary 
contributions at time t. The second term refers to those who have a PPP and do 
not make voluntary contributions at time t. The third term refers to those 
respondents who do not have a PPP and for whom data on voluntary 
contributions are thus not observed. By maximising this log likelihood function, 
we obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the vectors of the parameters  1 β  
and  2 β . 
The probit estimates of equation (1) corrected for sample selection are 
reported in Table 2.
21 We can see that the age dummies play a particularly 
important role in determining whether individuals make voluntary contributions 
to their PPPs. In particular, although, due to the compound interest effect, the 
financial value of the contributions is higher for younger people (Disney and 
Whitehouse, 1992), the probability of making these contributions increases with 
age. This suggests that the main motivation of this type of saving is to provide 
for retirement. Older people will in fact reach retirement sooner and are more  
 
                                                                                                                                    
20It is, in fact, well known that mobile workers are better off choosing a PPP. 
21This estimation is performed for the seven available waves pooled together. Although we have panel data, we 
are not able at this stage to incorporate unobserved individual heterogeneity fully while correcting for sample 
selection bias. However, we allow the observations to be independent across individuals. We also estimated 
equation (1) using a simple probit specification and a random-effects probit specification, not correcting for 
sample selection bias. The results, which we do not report, for brevity, were similar to those in Table 2. Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 2 
Probit Estimates for the Probability of Making Voluntary Contributions to PPPs 
(with Selection) 
Dependent variable = 1 if voluntary contributions to PPPs are made; = 0 otherwise 













Number of adults in household 
Number of dependent children in household 
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Financial situation expected to improve 
Permanent income (× 10
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Other variables 













































































2(51) = 150.89 
ρ  = –0.248 Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans 
481 
Notes to Table 2 
aOmitted categories are age 20–24, ‘no educational qualifications’ and ‘managers and administrators’. 
Notes: Regional and time dummies were included in all specifications. The estimates were obtained using the 
method illustrated by Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981). 
Source: BHPS, waves 2 to 8. 
 
likely to be worried about not having a comfortable living standard when the 
moment comes. Considering educational background, the probability of making 
voluntary contributions is highest for people with a college or higher educational 
qualification. This can be explained by a number of factors such as the lower 
discount rates and greater job security that these people are likely to face. One 
could also argue that, being characterised by complex charging structures, PPPs 
are generally difficult to understand for people with lower educational 
qualifications.
22 Regarding occupational effects, people working in clerical, 
secretarial and sales occupations are less likely to make voluntary contributions 
than the excluded category of managers and administrators. 
2. Random-Effects Tobit Regressions for the Amounts Contributed to PPPs and 
for Saving in Conventional Forms 
We next estimate an equation for the weekly voluntary contribution made by 
individual i at time t to his or her PPP. In this case, the dependent variable is 
observable but only takes positive values. We perform a similar exercise for 
weekly saving in more conventional forms. 
Since previous research has found that the precautionary motive plays a 
significant role in determining saving in the UK (see Dardanoni (1991), 
Merrigan and Normandin (1996), Miles (1997), Banks, Blundell and Brugiavini 
(1999) and Guariglia (2000)), it is important to include a measure of income risk 
in both specifications. The measure that we use is expected earnings variability, 
and it is based on the following question asked in waves 6 and 7 of the survey: 
‘In the next twelve months, how likely do you think it is that you will become 
unemployed?’. The answers that can be given to this question are: very likely, 
likely, unlikely and very unlikely. After rescaling these responses to 0–1, we can 
interpret them as a subjective probability distribution of the relevant event. In 
this framework, an individual loses his or her job with a subjectively evaluated 
probability of p, in which case he or she earns 0. With a probability of 1 p − , the 
individual does not lose his or her job and earns Y. The individual’s earnings can 
thus be seen as a random variable, with expected value equal to (1 ) pY −  and 
variance of 
2 (1 ) pp Y − . As in Lusardi (1998) and Guariglia (2000), we use the 
                                                                                                                                    
22It is unlikely that education plays an important role in determining the probability of making extra 
contributions to PPPs because it proxies for income effects. The latter are, in fact, directly taken into account in 
the regression through permanent income. Fiscal Studies 
482 
latter as our measure of income risk. Given that the relevant question is only 
asked in waves 6 and 7 of the BHPS, we only use these two waves in estimation. 
We estimate our equations for the amounts contributed to PPPs and for 
conventional saving using a random-effects tobit specification, which allows us 
to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity but not for selectivity bias. A 
tobit specification is necessary, since both types of saving are censored at 0. Our 
estimating equation can specifically be written as 
(6)  33 , it it it it sx V A Ru βγ ′ =+ +  
where:  it s  represents, in turn, saving in the form of voluntary contributions to 
PPPs and conventional saving for individual i at time t;  it x  is the vector of time-
invariant and time-variant exogenous variables described above;  it VAR  
represents expected earnings variability; and  3it u  is an unobservable error term. 
As it stands, this specification assumes that all inter-individual heterogeneity can 
be captured by the explanatory variables. However, unobserved, and possibly 
unobservable, attributes (such as tastes) may also influence the individual’s 
decisions on how much to save. Assuming that the heterogeneity across 
individuals is time-invariant, we can take it into account by including an 
individual-specific time-invariant effect in the error term.  3it u  can thus be 
decomposed as follows: 
(7)  3 , it i it uv e =+  
where  i v  represents the individual-specific effect, which we assume to be 
random, and  it e  is an idiosyncratic shock. 
Explicit corrections for sample selection bias are not necessary if 
specifications of this type are estimated over short panels. It is, in fact, 
reasonable to assume that, in this case, any correction would be time-invariant 
and would hence be absorbed in the individual-specific component of the error 
term (Baltagi, 1995). We also provide a formal test for the actual existence of a 
statistically significant selectivity bias in our two-wave sample, following the 
procedure described in Verbeeck and Nijman (1992). This procedure consists of 
including some additional variables in the regression equation and testing for 
their joint significance. In our context, the additional variables are the number of 
waves in which individual i answered yes to the PPP participation question and a 
dummy equal to 1 if the individual participated in a PPP in the previous year. 
Both variables were both individually and jointly statistically insignificant,   
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TABLE 3 
Random-Effects Tobit Estimates for Voluntary Contributions Made to PPPs and for 
Saving in More Conventional Forms 
 Weekly  voluntary 
contributions to PPPs 














Number of adults in household 
Number of dependent children in household 
Married or cohabiting 
Education
a 
University degree or higher 
A levels / professional qualifications 




Associate professional and technical 
Clerical and secretarial 
Craft-related 
Personal and protective services 
Sales 
Plant and machine operators 
Others 
Financial variables 
Financial situation expected to deteriorate 
Financial situation expected to improve 
Permanent income (× 10
-3) 
Other variables 
Owns a house 
Health status 













































































































































Sample size (of which censored at 0)  1,432 (371)  1,478 (634) 
Log likelihood  –4,792.14  –4,141.93 
Chi-squared  χ
2(47) = 444.91  χ
2(47) = 207.53 
Notes: See overleaf. Fiscal Studies 
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Notes to Table 3 
aOmitted categories are age 20–24, ‘no educational qualifications’ and ‘managers and administrators’. 
Note: The figures reported in italics are asymptotic t-ratios. Regional and time dummies were included in all 
specifications. 
Source: BHPS, waves 6 and 7. 
 
indicating the absence of a precisely determined selectivity bias in our sample.
23 
This conclusion further justifies our use of a simple random-effects tobit 
estimator. 
The first set of results in Table 3 are the estimates of equation (6) for the 
amounts contributed to PPPs. The explanatory variables included in addition to 
earnings variability are the same as those used in the probit case. We can see that 
the coefficients on the age dummies for those individuals aged 45 or over are 
generally positive and precisely determined. Their magnitudes suggest that, in 
spite of the fact that the financial value of the contributions is higher for the 
young, older people tend to make higher voluntary contributions to PPPs. The 
dummy variable relating to whether workers have at least a college degree is 
marginally statistically significant and positive. This indicates that those 
respondents with a college or higher degree contribute more than those with no 
educational qualifications. Respondents with high permanent income tend to 
make higher voluntary contributions, and workers employed in the clerical and 
secretarial sector contribute more than the omitted category of managers and 
administrators. The coefficient on our proxy for risk is negative, indicating that 
people with higher expected earnings variability contribute less to their PPPs. It 
is, however, only significant at the 19 per cent level. 
The second set of results in Table 3 are the estimates of a similar random-
effects tobit regression for saving in more conventional vehicles, such as bank 
accounts and Post Office accounts.
24 We can see that the dummies relating to the 
age-groups 35–39, 40–44 and 45–49 are precisely determined but, contrary to the 
previous case, they appear with a negative sign. Conventional saving is also 
lower for males and for respondents who expect their financial situation to 
improve. It is higher for people who have higher permanent income and for those 
who work in the ‘other’ occupational category. The coefficients on the 
educational dummies are generally poorly determined. Finally, as in Guariglia 
(2000), the earnings risk variable is positive and statistically significant, 
                                                                                                                                    
23According to Verbeeck and Nijman (1992), a third additional variable should have been introduced in the 
regression equation, i.e. a binary variable taking the value 1 if individual i answered yes in all waves to the 
question relating to his or her participation in a PPP. We did not include this variable because, given that we 
only analyse two waves of the BHPS, it would have been perfectly collinear with the first additional variable 
that we included. 
24Note that, to ease comparability between the two sets of results, we run the regressions on the same sample of 
individuals (i.e. the workers covered by PPPs). Similar results to the second set were obtained from estimating 
an analogous equation for saving without limiting the sample to those workers who are members of PPPs. Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans 
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suggesting that precautionary considerations play a key role in determining this 
type of saving.
25 
The fact that age dummies are an important determinant of saving in the form 
of voluntary contributions to PPPs, especially for the over-45s, suggests that this 
particular type of saving is aimed at ensuring a comfortable retirement. On the 
other hand, earnings risk strongly affects conventional saving, suggesting that 
the latter is aimed at buffering current consumption against income shocks. 
Being used for different purposes, the two types of saving are thus unlikely to 
offset each other totally. To check formally for the existence of an offsetting 
effect, we included conventional saving as an additional explanatory variable in 
the regression for voluntary contributions to PPPs. This variable entered with a 
positive sign and was precisely determined. Similarly in the equation for 
conventional saving, we entered voluntary contributions to PPPs as an additional 
explanatory variable. As in the previous case, the coefficient on this variable was 
positive and statistically significant, indicating no offsetting effect between the 
two types of saving. These results, which we do not report, for brevity, imply 
that, controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity, increments in one type 
of saving are associated with increments in the other. This suggests that there is 
no substitution between the two types of saving and that the voluntary 
contributions to PPPs are likely to represent new saving.
26 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have analysed the determinants of saving in the form of 
voluntary contributions to PPPs. This form of saving is tax-favoured, and one 
frequently asked question is whether it should offset other kinds of saving. The 
estimates of random-effects tobit equations have shown that, although their 
financial value is higher for younger people, voluntary contributions to PPPs 
significantly increase with age for individuals over 45. Conventional saving, on 
the other hand, is mainly driven by expected earnings variability. This suggests 
that the two types of saving are used for different purposes: the former to ensure 
a comfortable life in retirement and the latter for precautionary reasons. They are 
thus unlikely to be interchangeable and to offset each other completely. In 
support of this hypothesis, we have also shown that, controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, there does not appear to be a negative relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                    
25The results reported in both columns of Table 3 were robust to the use of an alternative measure of risk based 
on the variance of detrended earnings calculated over the available waves, as in Carroll and Samwick (1997) 
and Guariglia (2000). We do not report these results, for brevity. To check whether the use of a limited number 
of waves made any significant difference in the parameter estimates, we estimated random-effects tobit 
regressions for ordinary saving and for voluntary contributions to PPPs excluding the earnings variability term 
both on all the available waves and on waves 6 and 7 only. The results were generally similar in the two cases. 
26Using aggregated data for the UK, Blake (1998) reached a similar conclusion, finding that private personal 
pensions have a direct effect in increasing saving. Fiscal Studies 
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two types of saving. Finally, the fact that the main determinants of the two types 
of saving considered generally differ provides a warning against the use of broad 
measures of saving and wealth in the study of the motives for saving. 
This analysis puts the reforms proposed in the Green Paper, A New Contract 
for Welfare: Partnership in Pensions (DSS, 1998), in a favourable light. The 
Green Paper proposes the introduction of stakeholder pensions — simple 
pension schemes, organised collectively, which will be more cost-effective and 
flexible than the existing PPPs. As with PPPs, workers will be encouraged to opt 
out of the state second pension scheme, which will replace SERPS, and will have 
their NICs paid directly into the pension fund by the DSS. Moreover, there will 
be a strong incentive, in the form of an extra rebate, for people earning between 
£9,000 and £18,500 to join these new schemes. As with PPPs, it will be possible 
to make additional voluntary tax-free contributions to stakeholder pension plans, 
up to a certain limit. However, people contributing irregularly will not be 
penalised as much. The new schemes will also be made much easier to 
understand: in particular, workers will receive an annual statement saying clearly 
how much they have paid in, what the charges are and what they can expect to 
receive on retirement. This will allow even less-educated people to take 
advantage of these schemes and will encourage them to make contributions in 
excess of the statutory ones. Although the majority of full-time employees 
earning between £9,000 and £18,500 already have a personal pension (Disney, 
Emmerson and Tanner, 1999), thanks to their low costs, greater flexibility and 
improved clarity, stakeholder pensions are likely to become more popular than 
existing PPPs, giving more incentives to make extra contributions. The concerns 
of the government that people do not save enough for retirement will be reduced, 
and the shift towards privatisation of the UK pension system will move one step 
further. 
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